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  “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that . . . it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States today, an adult with a mental disability2 is 
held to the standard of care of a nondisabled, reasonably prudent 
person.3  That is, a mentally retarded4 adult is held to the standard 
 
       †  J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2014; B.A., Religion, 
magna cum laude, Carleton College, 2003.  The author would like to thank 
Professors Raleigh Hannah Levine and Michael K. Steenson for their guidance 
and critical feedback, and Frances Kern for her encouragement and careful 
attention. 
 1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897). 
 2. The term “mental disability” 
represents a convenient, conceptual shorthand for a group of 
impairments that affect emotional, developmental, social, or cognitive 
functioning, and that frequently are treated similarly within the 
framework of the law.  Included within “mental disability” are mental 
illness, mental retardation and certain other developmental disabilities, 
cognitive impairments, traumatic brain injury, learning disabilities, 
certain communication disorders, and alcoholism and other drug 
dependencies. 
JOHN PARRY, CIVIL MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 55 (2010).  
“Mental disability” is a relatively recent term.  Legal terminology for this group of 
people has changed over time.  Well into the twentieth century, “insane” was still 
used to refer to persons with mental illness, mental retardation, and other mental 
disabilities.  E.g., William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally 
Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52, 52, 61 (1960) (considering “the mentally ill and 
mentally deficient” in turn, yet at times referring to members of both groups as 
“insane persons”).  Mental disability is analogous to the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (APA) usage of “mental disorder.”  See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxx–xxxi (4th ed., text 
rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
 3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
11(c) (2010) (“An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not considered in 
determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”); e.g., Bashi 
v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635, 639–41 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 
41 (West 2007)); Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961); Jolley v. 
Powell, 299 So. 2d 647, 648–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Creasy v. Rusk, 730 
N.E.2d 659, 666–67 (Ind. 2000); Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 300–01 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965); DAN B. DOBBS, 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (2000). 
 4. The law has a history, mirroring society at large, of using demeaning 
language to describe individuals with mental retardation: “idiot,” “imbecile,” and 
“feeble-minded” were once regularly used.  James W. Ellis, Tort Responsibility of 
Mentally Disabled Persons, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1079, 1082 n.16.  This note uses 
the clinical term “mental retardation,” as defined by the APA, because the APA’s 
2
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of care of a reasonably prudent person of average intelligence, and 
a mentally ill5 adult is held to the standard of care of a reasonably 
prudent person of sound mind.  Adults with other mental 
disabilities, no matter how severe, are held to the objective, 
reasonably prudent person standard as well.6 
At first blush, this rule may not seem fair.  In fact, for over 150 
years, legal commentators have decried this long-standing rule as 
unjust and violative of the fault principle inherent in modern tort 
law.7  Yet, despite the vocal criticism, American courts have shown 
remarkable uniformity in their adherence to the traditional rule,8 
basing their stance on various policy rationales.9  As a result, adults 
with a mental disability are held to the objective10 standard of care. 
 
classification of mental disorders “is recognized in courts as an accepted standard 
for diagnosing mental conditions.”  PARRY, supra note 2, at 544.  According to the 
APA: 
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by 
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the 
following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B).  
The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 41.  This note does not use the term “developmental 
disability,” as defined by federal statute, because that term includes not only 
mental retardation but also such mental disabilities as autism and epilepsy, which 
are not addressed here in an individual capacity.  See 42 U.S.C. § 15002(8) (2006).  
The author is aware of the stigma that has been associated with the term mental 
retardation, in particular the usage of “retarded.”  However, the term continues to 
be medically accurate and remains relevant in describing the individuals this note 
aims to address. 
 5. People with mental illness have also faced stigma in society and by what 
courts have called them; “mad,” “lunatic,” “insane,” and “crazy” have all been 
employed.  Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082 n.16.  The term “mental illness” is used by 
such advocacy groups as the National Alliance on Mental Illness and will be used 
in this note.  NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2012).  For the purposes of this note, mental illness is “a broad 
category of conditions that can include behavioral and emotional disorders, as 
well as cognitive and organic disorders related to neurological and medical 
conditions that affect the brain.”  PARRY, supra note 2, at 55–56. 
 6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 11(c) (2010).  The objective standard of care is described by the 
Restatement: “A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable 
care under all the circumstances.”  Id. § 3. 
 7. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 75–129 and accompanying text. 
 10. The standard is “objective” because it assesses an actor’s conduct against 
the ideal of a “reasonably prudent person,” rather than against the subjective 
qualities of the actor herself.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
3
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This note begins by examining the history of the objective 
standard of care and its application to children, physically disabled 
adults, and mentally disabled adults.11  Part III takes a closer look at 
the objective mental disability standard,12 and Part IV argues that a 
subjective mental disability standard is appropriate and feasible.13  
Part V contends that, in the alternative, courts should apply a 
subjective standard with mentally retarded adults.14  The note 
concludes that a much-needed policy change may be achieved if 
courts consider individual types of mental disabilities separately.15 
II. HISTORY 
A. Origins of the Objective Standard of Care 
Early tort law, through the writ of trespass, was by and large a 
system of strict liability.16  While a breach of the King’s peace would 
be punished only if a defendant’s conduct was morally 
blameworthy,17 an action in trespass could succeed regardless of the 
moral culpability of the defendant.18  An initial aim of both 
criminal law and tort law was to discourage violence and revenge.19  
Over time the purpose of tort law shifted from punishing a 
 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. a (2010).  This note will employ the 
shorthand terms “subjective standard” and “objective standard” to denote, 
respectively, a standard of care that does or does not take into account certain 
qualities of a given actor—specifically, childhood, physical disability, and mental 
disability—in deciding whether the actor is liable for negligence.  (At times, this 
note uses such variants as “subjective childhood standard” and “objective mental 
disability standard” to denote the application of these shorthand terms to a 
specific group.)  This usage follows the Restatement’s: “With physical disabilities, 
then—just as with childhood—tort law tailors the negligence standard to 
acknowledge the individual situation of the actor.  To this extent, tort law employs 
what can be called a subjective rather than a fully objective standard of care.”  Id. § 
11 cmt. b. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Part VI. 
 16. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 14, at 26 (“[A]t least according to the dominant 
view, trespass was initially a kind of strict liability tort.”); Francis H. Bohlen, Liability 
in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9, 16–17 (1925). 
 17. E.g., Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.) 284 (“[F]elony must 
be done animo felonico . . . .”). 
 18. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 14, at 26 (stating that “[t]he writ of trespass was 
based on direct force,” not moral fault). 
 19. Id. § 8, at 12. 
4
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wrongdoer to providing redress to a private party.20  The historical 
distinction between trespass and case21 eventually precipitated the 
introduction of the fault principle into English and American tort 
law.22 
In the nineteenth century, tort law began to develop a general 
basis for liability based on fault.23  To govern negligence law, courts 
established a fault-based standard of care based on the notion of 
the “reasonable man,” against which tortfeasors would be judged.24  
According to this standard, an actor was required to exercise the 
care that a hypothetical “reasonably prudent man” would exercise 
under the circumstances to avoid “unreasonable risks of 
foreseeable harm.”25  The “reasonable man”26 was a person of 
ordinary intelligence, experience, and judgment.27  He was 
expected to exercise ordinary care, not extraordinary care.28 
 
 20. E.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, § 2, at 4; Patrick Kelley, Infancy, Insanity, and 
Infirmity in the Law of Torts, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 179, 185 (2003); see, e.g., McIntyre v. 
Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887) (“There certainly can be nothing wrong or 
unjust in a verdict which merely gives compensation for the actual loss resulting 
from an injury inflicted.”). 
 21. The writ of case covered indirect injuries and “was associated with fault 
such as intent or negligence on the part of the defendant.”  DOBBS, supra note 3, § 
14, at 26. 
 22. See id. § 14, at 27 (noting that, by 1850, “courts tended to assume that 
some kind of fault—negligence or intentional wrong—was required to establish 
tort liability in most cases” (citing Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 
(1850))); Kelley, supra note 20, at 182–83.  Today, “the great majority of tort cases 
turn on some kind of perception that the defendant is at fault in a significant way.”  
DOBBS, supra note 3, § 9, at 16. 
 23. DOBBS, supra note 3, §§ 112–113 (tracing this development). 
 24. Id. § 117, at 277.  Professor Dobbs notes that courts have used different 
language to express the same idea: “The standard is often described as the 
standard of ordinary care, due care, or reasonable care.  It may also be referred to 
as the reasonable person or prudent person standard.”  Id. § 117, at 278 (citation 
omitted); e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (P.C.) 492; 3 Bing. 
(N.C.) 468, 472 (“[T]here were no means of estimating the defendant’s 
negligence, except by taking as a standard, the conduct of a man of ordinary 
prudence . . . .”). 
 25. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 116, at 275 (citing Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915)).  See supra note 6 for the current Restatement 
formulation of the objective standard of care. 
 26. This is now more commonly referred to as the gender-neutral “reasonably 
prudent person.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. a (2010); DOBBS, supra note 3, § 117, at 277 n.4. 
 27. Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 (1915) (“A [reasonably 
prudent man] does not mean an ideal or perfect man, but an ordinary member of 
the community.  He is usually spoken of as an ordinarily reasonable, careful, and 
prudent man.”). 
 28. Id. 
5
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Sometimes, though, the exercise of ordinary care was an 
extraordinary requirement.  That is, it was sometimes impossible 
for a physically or mentally disabled person, or a child, to meet the 
reasonable man standard.  Still, that actor was held to the standard 
of conduct of a reasonably prudent, non-disabled adult.29  At the 
end of the nineteenth century, no disability—including the 
“disability” of childhood30—was taken into account in assessing an 
actor’s conduct, even though her disability made it impossible for 
her to conform to the objective standard.31  Despite the general 
shift to a fault-based negligence system,32 disability—physical 
disability, mental disability, and childhood—was still governed by a 
strict liability rule because the members of each class were held to a 
standard that they often could not meet and were liable for harms 
that they often could not avoid.33 
B. Development of Exceptions to the Objective Standard for Children and 
Physically Disabled Adults 
At early common law under the objective standard of care, 
children34 and adults with physical disabilities35 were held liable for 
the harm they negligently caused, even when they could not avoid 
that harm.  By the early twentieth century, scholars began calling 
for a subjective standard for children “who had no capacity to avoid 
the conduct causing the harm.”36  The Restatement (First) of Torts 
 
 29. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082. 
 30. Because children generally have less capacity to avoid risks than a 
reasonably prudent adult does, this note will refer to childhood as a “disability” to 
introduce a rough analogy to physical and mental disabilities.  In the past, the tort 
liability of children and mentally disabled people was analogized because 
members of both groups often failed to measure up to the reasonable man 
standard.  See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 16, at 12 (discussing “cases which hold an 
infant or insane person liable for a violation of another’s” personal or property 
integrity). 
 31. Kelley, supra note 20, at 183–95. 
 32. See David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 703–05 (1992); see 
Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082–83; supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 33. E.g., Curran, supra note 2, at 65 (“To impose liability for negligence [on a 
mentally disabled person], . . . the court must blindly apply the objective 
reasonable man standard.  [This] is in effect strict liability . . . .”). 
 34. See Bohlen, supra note 16, at 9–10; Kelley, supra note 20, at 188. 
 35. See Terry, supra note 27, at 47. 
 36. Kelley, supra note 20, at 188, 193 (“These authors argued, simply, that it 
was unfair to hold someone civilly liable for conduct he could not have avoided 
because of his age . . . .”). 
6
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exempted children from the objective standard of care,37 famously 
stating that a child’s “conduct is to be judged by the standard of 
behaviour to be expected from a child of like age, intelligence and 
experience.”38  This exemption continues to this day.39 
Given their immaturity and lack of experience, children are 
thought to need special protection.40  Young children in particular 
are often incapable of taking necessary precautions to avoid harm 
to themselves and others.41  Due to their size, young children 
generally have less ability to cause harm than adults, which may 
account in part for the subjective childhood standard.42  Even older 
children are granted the benefit of a subjective standard, perhaps 
because most children eventually grow into fully functioning, 
reasonable adults.43  In other words, the “disability” of childhood, 
 
 37. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 (1934) (“Unless the actor is a child 
or an insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid 
being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”).  While 
this section also appears to exempt “insane” persons, a Caveat states, “The 
[American Law] Institute expresses no opinion as to whether insane persons are 
required to conform to the standard of behaviour which society demands of sane 
persons for the protection of the interests of others.”  Id. at Caveat.  The ALI’s 
neutrality did not last long: “Unless the actor is a child, his insanity or other 
mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct which does 
not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. e (1934). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
10(a) (2010) (“A child’s conduct is negligent if it does not conform to that of a 
reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence, and experience . . . .”). 
 40. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 125; Kelley, supra note 20, at 196–203.  A modern 
version of this sentiment is stated in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 10 cmt. b (2010): 
Children are less able than adults to maintain an attitude of attentiveness 
toward the risks their conduct may occasion and the risks to which they 
may be exposed.  Similarly, children are less able than adults to 
understand risks, to appreciate alternative courses of conduct with 
respect to risks, and to make appropriate choices from among those 
alternatives. 
 41. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 126. 
 42. At the same time, it is well established that children engaged in “adult” or 
“inherently dangerous” activities are held to the reasonably prudent person 
(adult) standard.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 10(c) (2010).  When engaged in an inherently dangerous 
activity, a child has the potential to cause as much harm as an adult, which may 
explain tort law’s departure from the usual subjective child standard. 
 43. However, the older a child gets, the less likely her age will shield her from 
being liable for negligence.  Id. § 10 cmt. b.  A child of seventeen can avoid risks of 
harm as well as an adult in many situations, and thus the precautions that a 
seventeen-year-old of “like . . . intelligence and experience” would take are often 
7
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and the special legal treatment children receive, is temporary.  
Furthermore, childhood is a universal fact of human experience, 
which may explain why the law takes it into account in assessing 
liability for negligence.44 
While the subjective standard for children gained traction, 
commentators began calling for a subjective standard for physically 
disabled adults.45  The original hypothetical “reasonable man” was 
able-bodied,46 but it was thought unjust to require a physically 
disabled person to take precautions that he was physically 
incapable of taking.47 
Physical disabilities are often fairly easy to diagnose,48 which 
allows courts to expediently determine their nature and extent.  
The fact that many physical disabilities are readily observable makes 
them more difficult to falsify.49  In addition, persons with physical 
disabilities are often able to advocate for themselves, which may 
partly explain the law’s allowance50 of a subjective standard. 
Unlike the subjective childhood standard, though, the 
subjective physical disability standard is often said to demand both 
less and more of a physically disabled person.51  While a physically 
 
identical to the precautions that a reasonably prudent adult would take.  Id. 
 44. Courts have articulated a policy of letting children be children, allowing 
them to explore and learn, and not quashing their curiosity via a constant threat 
of liability.  DOBBS, supra note 3, § 125, at 296.  A similar policy seems to justify the 
attractive nuisance doctrine.  See id. § 236, at 614. 
 45. Kelley, supra note 20, at 195; Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or 
Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1927) (“In physical characteristics, the standard 
man appears to be identical with the actor.  Unless we are to have a completely 
objective standard and eliminate all connotation of fault . . ., we cannot require 
that a person . . . shall do that . . . which it is physically impossible for him to do.”). 
 46. See Kelley, supra note 20, at 192; Terry, supra note 27, at 47 (“Every man, 
whether he is a standard man or not, is required to act as a standard man 
would.”). 
 47. See Seavey, supra note 45, at 13; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 175–76 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS] (“The person who is . . . physically disabled, is 
entitled to live in the world and to have allowance made by others for his disability, 
and the person cannot be required to do the impossible by conforming to physical 
standards which he cannot meet.”).   
 48. For example, deafness, blindness, or amputation. 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 11 cmt. a (2010) (“The physical disabilities this Section takes into account 
generally need to be significant and objectively verifiable.”). 
 50. Id. § 11(a) (“The conduct of an actor with a physical disability is negligent 
only if the conduct does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person with 
the same disability.”). 
 51. See id. § 11 cmt. b; DOBBS, supra note 3, § 119, at 283. 
8
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disabled adult is not required to do what she is physically incapable 
of doing,52 she may be required to take additional precautions if 
the circumstances demand it.53  For example, to exercise 
reasonable care, a blind person may be required to use a cane or 
some other assistance while crossing a busy street, and a 
wheelchair-bound person may be required not to operate her 
wheelchair on uneven terrain.54  As such, the standard sometimes 
requires physically disabled people to offset the effects of their 
disability by anticipating certain risks and taking certain 
precautions.55 
In the mid-twentieth century, Dean Prosser crystallized56 the 
subjective childhood and physical disability standards through his 
influential treatise57 and his role as Reporter for the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.58  Prosser’s argument for a subjective standard 
for both groups exerted a strong influence on courts and legal 
commentators.59  While the limitations of both groups are taken 
into account, children have the most subjective standard.60 
 
 52. E.g., Ellis, supra note 4, at 1098 (“[T]he physically [disabled] are not 
required to take what would be for them impossible measures for their own 
protection or for the protection of others.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 11 cmt. b (2010). 
 55. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 1100 (“[T]he form of the subjective standard for 
the physically disabled incorporates the individual’s knowledge of his own 
handicap.”). 
 56. Kelley, supra note 20, at 199–201. 
 57. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 227–31 (1941). 
 58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (holding a child to the 
conduct reasonably expected of a child of “like age, intelligence, and 
experience”); id. § 283C (holding a physically disabled person to the standard of 
conduct “of a reasonable man under like disability”). 
 59. Kelley, supra note 20, at 200–01, 203 (“Prosser influenced the 
development of the law . . . by describing the law generally in a way that led lawyers 
and judges to assume that was what the law was.”). 
 60. The conduct of a physically disabled adult is compared to that of a 
reasonable adult with the same disability, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(a) (2010), but the conduct of a child is 
compared to that of a reasonable child “of the same age, intelligence, and 
experience,” id. § 10(a).  The childhood standard is more subjective because it 
takes into account several characteristics of the child, while the physical disability 
standard only considers the person’s disability.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 119, at 
281 (noting that the standard of care for physically disabled actors is “partly 
subjective”).   
9
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C. No Exception for Mentally Disabled Adults 
While the law exempted children and physically disabled 
adults from the objective standard of care, it did not do so for 
mentally disabled adults.  The objective mental disability standard 
is traced61 to dicta in Weaver v. Ward: “[I]f a lunatick hurt a man, he 
shall be answerable in trespass: and therefore no man shall be 
excused of a trespass . . . except it may be judged utterly without his 
fault.”62  Because the law of trespass in early seventeenth-century 
England was by and large a system of strict liability,63 the statement 
in Weaver is consistent with the law of that time.64 
As early as the mid-nineteenth century, scholars began 
critiquing this standard.65  In 1881, Justice Holmes, emphasizing 
the deterrence purpose of tort liability,66 stated: “[I]f insanity of a 
pronounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the sufferer from 
complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense would 
require it to be admitted as an excuse.”67  Holmes reasoned that an 
actor who simply cannot comport his conduct to that of a 
reasonable man cannot be deterred from violating the reasonable 
 
 61. E.g., Bohlen, supra note 16, at 13; Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082. 
 62. Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.) 284. 
 63. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 64. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082 (“Within the context of strict liability, the rule 
[that mentally disabled adults are held responsible for the torts they commit] 
made sense . . . .”). 
 65. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 455–56 
(1847) (“In the case of the compos mentis, . . . the act punished is that of a party 
competent to foresee and guard against the consequences of his conduct; and 
inevitable accident has always been held an excuse.  In the case of the lunatic it 
may be urged, both that no good policy requires the interposition of the law, and 
that the act belongs to the class of cases which may well be termed inevitable 
accidents.”), quoted in Kelley, supra note 20, at 184; see also Bohlen, supra note 16, at 
18 n.15 (calling the objective mental disability standard “a curious recurrence to 
the early objective attitude of the law which looked to the objective wrongfulness 
of the act rather than the subjective culpability of the actor”). 
 66. Kelley describes Justice Holmes’s emphasis on deterrence: “Since the 
object and ultimately sole justification for tort liability is deterrence, liability 
should not be imposed on those who are undeterrable, either because they are 
incapable of foreseeing danger from their conduct or because the threat of 
liability can have no impact on their conduct.”  Kelley, supra note 20, at 186. 
 67. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 109 (1881).  While 
Justice Holmes appears to advance an affirmative defense for “pronounced” types of 
mental disability rather than a subjective standard of care that takes an actor’s mental 
disability into account to determine whether she was negligent in the first place, 
his criticism of the objective standard is apparent.  See infra notes 150–51 and 
accompanying text, which address the difference between a subjective standard 
and an affirmative defense for mental disability. 
10
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man standard by the threat of tort liability.68  Professor Francis H. 
Bohlen, writing in 1925, argued that holding mentally disabled 
people to the objective standard should yield to “the modern 
concept that liability must be founded on fault.”69 
While this line of reasoning has continued among legal 
commentators,70 it has held little sway over courts, which have 
overwhelmingly treated mentally disabled defendants under the 
objective standard of care.71  According to the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts, “An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not 
considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless 
the actor is a child.”72 
III. ASSESSING THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR MENTALLY DISABLED 
ADULTS 
Because a mentally disabled person who negligently injured 
someone yet was incapable of avoiding her conduct is not morally 
at fault,73 the objective mental disability standard does not accord 
with modern fault-based tort liability.74  As a result, “American 
courts in common law jurisdictions identified [this issue] as a 
 
 68. See HOLMES, supra note 67, at 109. 
 69. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 31–32. 
 70. E.g., Curran, supra note 2, at 65; Ellis, supra note 4, at 1082; Harry J.F. 
Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 
20 (1995). 
 71. E.g., Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 666–67 (Ind. 2000) (“We hold that a 
person with mental disabilities is generally held to the same standard of care as 
that of a reasonable person under the same circumstances without regard to the 
alleged tortfeasor’s capacity to control or understand the consequences of his or 
her actions.”); Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 543 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Wis. 1996) 
(“We remain hesitant to abandon the long-standing rule in favor of a broad rule 
adopting the subjective standard for all mentally disabled persons.”).  Mentally 
disabled plaintiffs, on the other hand, were historically treated under a subjective 
negligence standard.  E.g., Terry, supra note 27, at 47 (“In the case of contributory 
negligence there is an exception to [the reasonably prudent person] rule in the 
case of . . . persons of unsound mind.”).  See infra notes 152–60 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of contributory negligence and the law’s 
historical dual treatment of mentally disabled plaintiffs and defendants. 
 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
11(c) (2010).  In line with the courts and with the previous Restatements, section 
11(c) covers both mental retardation and mental illness, among other “mental or 
emotional disabilit[ies].”  See id. 
 73. See, e.g., Bohlen, supra note 16, at 31 (“[Where liability] is imposed upon 
persons capable of fault only if they have been guilty of fault, [mental disability], 
which destroys the capacity for fault, should preclude the possibility of liability.”). 
 74. Curran, supra note 2, at 65; see Owen, supra note 32, at 703–05. 
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question of public policy and unanimously chose to retain the 
[objective standard].”75  The policy rationales that courts developed 
can be organized into five categories: (1) incentive, (2) strict 
liability, (3) administrative difficulty, (4) integration, and (5) 
counterbalancing.  Upon examination, the rationales for the 
current rule are inadequate to justify the law’s treatment of adults 
with mental disabilities.76 
According to the incentive rationale, if mentally disabled 
adults are held liable for their torts, their guardians or heirs will be 
economically motivated to ensure that their charges do not cause 
harm.77  This rationale has been roundly criticized78 because an 
heir or guardian would be more motivated to ensure his charge 
does no harm if he were directly liable for the mentally disabled 
person’s actions.79  Furthermore, this rationale incentivizes 
guardians and caretakers to confine their charges rather than risk 
 
 75. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1083. 
 76. See id. at 1090; Korrell, supra note 70, at 45. 
 77. McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887); Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 
P.2d 298, 300–01 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B 
cmt. b(4) (1965). 
 78. Korrell notes that the incentive rationale all but died before it was 
resuscitated by law and economics scholars.  Korrell, supra note 70, at 28 (citing 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
85 (1987)).  The economic incentive theory contends that holding mentally 
disabled people to a strict liability standard expends fewer judicial resources and 
better incentivizes safe conduct.  Id. at 30–32.  However, the same could be said for 
children or physically disabled people, and “under our fault-based negligence 
regime, the fact that it may be more efficient to hold a mentally disabled 
defendant to a standard he cannot meet is of no consequence.”  Id. at 31–32.  
Korrell also rejects Landes and Posner’s comparison of mental disability and 
abnormally dangerous activities.  Id. at 32–33.  See infra note 93 for a comparison 
between the objective mental disability standard and other instances of strict 
liability in modern tort law. 
 79. Korrell, supra note 70, at 29; David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations 
and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the 
Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 38 (1981).  Along the same lines, 
Professor Bohlen argued: 
It would seem that if the security of the public demanded that the family 
of insane persons should be required to prevent them from becoming a 
menace . . . the proper way to effect this would be by imposing upon 
them the duty to restrain the insane person and by making [the family] 
responsible for his insane acts . . . . It is neither effective nor just to 
impose upon the family the indirect incentive of self-interest at the price 
of making the insane person answerable for the faults of those who 
should be his guardians. 
Bohlen, supra note 16, at 35 n.38.  Even Kelley, who opposes a subjective standard 
for mental disability, rejects the incentive rationale.  Kelley, supra note 20, at 206. 
12
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liability,80 which is contrary to modern public policy.81 
The strict liability rationale has three main expressions: (1) 
“where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be 
borne by the one who occasioned it”;82 (2) if a mentally disabled 
person has money, it is only fair to require her to compensate 
someone she injures;83 and (3) the primary purpose of tort law is 
compensation.84  The first expression is simply a statement of strict 
liability.85  It accurately describes an objective standard for mental 
disability, but it does not explain or support that standard.  
Professor Bohlen called this principle “a mere restatement of the 
old concept of liability without fault dressed up in a new form so as 
to appear modern and just.”86  The second expression is a subset of 
the first, addressing mentally disabled persons who are financially 
able to compensate others, but it similarly does not explain why 
they should be required to do so. 
The third expression, that compensation is the primary 
purpose of tort law, presents a more substantive argument for the 
objective mental disability standard.  At the end of the nineteenth 
century, Judge Thomas M. Cooley explained that the compensation 
goal of tort law, unlike the punishment goal of criminal law, 
supports tort liability for mentally disabled people.87  Cooley’s 
 
 80. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1085–86. 
 81. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)(2006), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) 
(Supp. III 2009) (“The Congress finds that . . . the Nation’s proper goals regarding 
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals . . . .”).  
While the Americans With Disabilities Act does not directly address the tort 
liability of people with mental disabilities, its principles of equality are relevant to 
the present inquiry. 
 82. Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927); see also Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 
2d 647, 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Williams v. Kearby, 775 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 1989); Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449, 449–50 (N.Y. 1894); Beals v. See, 10 
Pa. 56 (1848). 
 83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (1965). 
 84. Delahanty v. Hinkley, 799 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D.D.C. 1992); THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE 
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 56 (Callaghan & Co. 1907) (1878) (“There is no 
distinction as to liability between torts of nonfeasance and of misfeasance, because 
the ground of liability is the damage caused by the tort.” (citing Williams v. Hays, 
38 N.E. 449, 451–52 (N.Y. 1894))). 
 85. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1084; see Seidelson, supra note 79, at 37–38. 
 86. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 17. 
 87. COOLEY, supra note 84, at 54–56.  Judge Cooley contrasted the role of 
compensation in criminal law and tort law: “[C]ompensation in the case of public 
wrongs is usually a subordinate purpose, while in the case of private wrongs it is 
the substantial purpose of the law.”  Id. at 10. 
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theory is described by Kelley: 
In the criminal law, where the object is to punish wrongful 
acts done with evil intent, we do not punish . . . [mentally 
disabled people] who lack the capacity to form an evil 
intent. . . . The purpose of civil liability for a tortious 
injury, on the other hand, is not to punish one who acted 
with evil intent but to compensate a wrong suffered . . . .88 
This is, in essence, a strict liability approach because the 
emphasis is not on whether the defendant was at fault but on 
whether the plaintiff suffered harm.  A mentally disabled defendant 
who was incapable of adhering her conduct to that of a reasonably 
prudent person is more accurately characterized as “innocent” than 
at fault.89 
In contrast to Judge Cooley, Justice Holmes argued that the 
basic purpose of tort law is to deter undesirable behavior, which 
cannot be accomplished by holding a mentally disabled person to a 
standard of conduct she is incapable of meeting.90  In other words, 
some mentally disabled people cannot be deterred from engaging 
in certain risky conduct because of their disability.91 
The debate about the “primary” purpose of tort law continues 
to this day.92  However, compensation and deterrence are dual 
 
 88. Kelley, supra note 20, at 185. 
 89. See SEDGWICK, supra note 65, at 456. 
 90. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 91. Some argue that mentally disabled people who cannot control their 
conduct to such an extent that they present a high risk of injuring others in the 
community should not be allowed to live in the community.  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. e (2010).  
While such a policy may be justified for severely mentally disabled people who 
present the highest risk of injuring others, it does not extend to other mentally 
disabled people who do not present an unreasonable risk to others in the 
community.  Society has made a deliberate decision to integrate mentally disabled 
people into the community, whenever possible, which is incongruent with a policy 
of confinement.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. III 2009); see infra note 115. 
 92. E.g., Kelley, supra note 20, at 211–19.  Kelley argues that the purpose of 
the tort system is “to redress private injustices, defined as objectively wrongful 
breaches of the community’s safety conventions.”  Id. at 181.  For example, if a 
plaintiff had no reason to know of a defendant’s mental disability and thus had 
“reasonable expectations” that the defendant would follow a safety convention of 
the community, but the defendant did not follow it and as a result the plaintiff was 
injured, the plaintiff was objectively wronged and should be compensated.  See id. 
at 208 (citing Seidelson, supra note 79, at 19–20), 213−19.  On the other hand, if 
the plaintiff did not have reasonable expectations that the defendant would follow 
the safety convention because she knew of the defendant’s mental disability, the 
plaintiff was not objectively wronged and should not be compensated.  See id. at 
213−19.  However, why should a plaintiff’s “reasonable expectations” outweigh a 
14
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purposes that should both be present before liability is imposed.93  
Deterrence without compensable injury does not give rise to tort 
liability;94 absent compelling policy reasons,95 neither should 
compensable injury without deterrence.  In either case, the 
foundation of modern tort liability is half missing. 
The administrative difficulty rationale has three basic 
expressions as well: (1) if mentally disabled people are granted a 
subjective standard, unscrupulous tortfeasors will feign a mental 
disability;96 (2) a subjective mental disability standard would result 
in severe and costly evidentiary problems, as seen with the insanity 
defense in criminal law;97 and (3) it is too difficult to draw a line 
between mental disability and mere “variations of temperament, 
intellect, and emotional balance which cannot, as a practical 
matter, be taken into account in imposing liability for damage 
done.”98  Each argument will be considered in turn. 
As to the first administrative difficulty argument––that people 
will affect a mental disability to avoid liability––modern psychology 
 
defendant’s actual ability to conform to a community’s safety convention?  See 
infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of notice in 
a subjective mental disability standard. 
 93. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8, at 12 (“The most commonly mentioned aims of 
tort law are (1) compensation of injured persons and (2) deterrence of 
undesirable behavior.”).  In general, there must be sufficient policy reasons for 
allowing the tension to break in favor of compensation.  Besides the objective 
mental disability rule, other pockets of strict liability in modern tort law involve 
vicarious liability, products liability, abnormally dangerous activities, wandering 
farm animals, and exotic pets.  Id. §§ 333, 342–348, 352.  With abnormally 
dangerous activities, exotic pets, and products liability, there is a high likelihood 
of severe harm despite the actor exercising every reasonable precaution.  See id. §§ 
351, 353.  The average mentally disabled person living in the world does not pose 
a comparable risk.  Moreover, a defendant chooses to engage in each of the above 
activities that give rise to strict liability, while a mentally disabled person does not 
choose to be mentally disabled.  And, with vicarious liability, products liability, and 
some abnormally dangerous activities, the defendant engages in the activity for 
her own pecuniary benefit, which can hardly be said of a mentally disabled person 
living in the world.  Korrell, supra note 70, at 44.  Korrell notes that, unlike 
employers or manufacturers of defective products, mentally disabled people are 
not good risk distributors.  Id. 
 94. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 377, at 1047. 
 95. See supra note 93. 
 96. See McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill. 1887); Williams v. Kearbey, 
775 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 895J cmt. a (1977)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(2) (1965). 
 97. See Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); 
Schumann v. Crofoot, 602 P.2d 298, 300 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(2) (1965)). 
 98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(1) (1965). 
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has advanced to such an extent that diagnostic criteria are readily 
available for virtually any mental disability, making it difficult to 
falsify one.99  Courts regularly rely on these criteria.100  Moreover, 
unlike an accused, a tort defendant is unlikely to feign a mental 
disability in order to avoid civil liability.101 
The next administrative difficulty argument, that a subjective 
mental disability standard would wreak havoc in tort law, is a 
specter for two reasons.  First, mental disability is already assessed 
in other civil contexts without disastrous administrative 
consequences, including guardianship, commitment, and 
testamentary capacity proceedings.102  When evaluating a plaintiff’s 
or defendant’s mental disability, triers can rely on expert opinion 
as well as their own experience and common sense.103  What’s 
more, courts already take mental disability into account in the case 
of children,104 apparently without undue difficulty.  Second, unlike 
the insanity defense, a subjective standard would not be all-or-
nothing but would assess a mentally disabled adult’s conduct 
against the standard of a reasonably prudent person with the same 
mental disability.105  Under a subjective standard, the same mentally 
 
 99. See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2 (providing diagnostic criteria for all 
mental disabilities recognized at the time of publication). 
 100. See supra note 4; see, e.g., Fuller v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 423 F.3d 104, 107 
(2d Cir. 2005) (describing the DSM–IV as an “objective authority on the subject of 
mental disorders”); In re Mohawk Valley Psychiatric Ctr., 818 N.Y.S.2d 766, 770–71 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (“[B]y law, to determine if [a] patient has a mental disorder, 
[this] court must take judicial notice of and apply the DSM-IV.”). 
 101. Bohlen, supra note 16, at 36 n.38 (“[W]hile a [criminal] defendant may 
[feign insanity] . . . to escape imprisonment or death, it seems improbable that he 
would so discredit himself to escape the payment of money damages.”); Ellis, supra 
note 4, at 1087 (doubting that tort defendants would be “willing to assume the 
stigmatizing effects” of mental disability “when money damages are the only 
penalty at issue”); Seidelson, supra note 79, at 39. 
 102. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1089.  
 103. Id.; see Seidelson, supra note 79, at 38−39. 
 104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
10 cmt. c (2010) (“Although [an adult’s] . . . mental or emotional disability is . . . 
not generally taken into account, under the more flexible rules applicable to 
children[,] any evidence of mental or emotional deficit can be considered.”); Ellis, 
supra note 4, at 1103.  Thus, a child with a mental disability has the benefit of a 
subjective standard until the day she turns eighteen, at which point she is treated 
like an adult with no mental disability. 
 105. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1108 (“[A] subjective standard . . . [would] not 
immunize mentally disabled people from responsibility for their torts, but [would 
relieve them of liability] . . . when they can show that they did their best to avoid 
the accident and that further preventive measures were beyond their ability.”).  
See infra Part IV.B.1 for a full description of the author’s proposed subjective 
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disabled defendant could be found negligent under one set of facts 
but not negligent under another, even when she accidentally 
caused someone harm in both circumstances.106 
The advances of modern psychology and medicine dispose of 
the third administrative difficulty argument as well: that it is too 
difficult to draw a line between mental disability and legally 
insignificant variations in temperament, emotions, and intellect.  
Courts using a subjective mental disability standard would likely 
require a sufficient magnitude of mental disability in order for it to 
be relevant.107  Some cases may be close calls.  Yet, the fact that the 
administration of a subjective mental disability standard would 
require skill and care does not justify eschewing it altogether.108 
Similar to the administrative difficulty rationale, it may be 
argued that, if an adult’s mental disability is taken into 
consideration in determining her standard of care, so too should 
an adult’s accident proneness, clumsiness, or ineptitude.109  In 
response, a clumsy or inept person with no mental disability can 
probably adjust his conduct to avoid certain situations where his 
clumsiness or ineptitude bears a high risk of injuring others, based 
on prior experience.  In contrast, a mentally disabled person may 
not be able to do so because her disability impairs her ability to 
adjust her conduct, at least to some degree.  Thus, it would seem 
that an accident-prone adult without a mental disability is, on 
average, better able to anticipate and avoid risks than an adult with 
a mental disability, and only the latter should receive the benefit of 
a subjective standard of care. 
The integration rationale110 has been formulated in two basic 
 
mental disability standard. 
 106. For example, an adult with mild mental retardation could be found liable 
for driving into a pedestrian yet not liable for bumping into and knocking over an 
elderly person.  A factual inquiry into either set of circumstances would determine 
her fault, not an inflexible rule. 
 107. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 1089; infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 108. Seidelson, supra note 79, at 40.  Our legal system asks juries to use skill 
and care in deciding questions of fact in challenging cases all the time.  Why 
should this area of law be different?  Cf. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 918 (Cal. 
1968) (“Indubitably juries and trial courts, constantly called upon to distinguish 
the frivolous from the substantial and the fraudulent from the meritorious, reach 
some erroneous results.  But such fallibility, inherent in the judicial process, offers 
no reason for substituting for the case-by-case resolution of causes an artificial and 
indefensible [rule].”). 
 109. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 121, at 286–87. 
 110. For reasons soon to be apparent, this could more aptly be called the “anti-
integration” rationale.  See infra notes 117–22 and accompanying text. 
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ways: (1) “if mental defectives are to live in the world they should 
pay for the damage they do;”111 and (2) “deinstitutionalization [of 
mentally disabled people] becomes more socially acceptable if 
innocent victims are at least assured of [the] opportunity for 
compensation when they suffer injury.”112  Considered in light of 
deinstitutionalization,113 these rationales are unsound.  The era of 
institutionalizing mentally disabled people mars this nation’s 
history.114  As institutions for the mentally disabled were closed and 
the former residents began integrating115 into the community, they 
were “unevenly and grudgingly” received.116  The two expressions of 
the integration rationale reveal a begrudging attitude toward 
integration.117 
The first expression is blatantly hostile to the notion of people 
with mental disabilities living in the world because it makes them 
insurers of their neighbors.118  Such hostility goes against society’s 
decision to integrate people with mental disabilities.119  Thinly 
 
 111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b(3) (1965). 
 112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
11 cmt. e (2010). 
 113. Deinstitutionalization refers to the closure of large treatment facilities for 
people with mental disabilities, allowing the former residents to live in the 
community and receive more humane treatment.  See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“‘[D]einstitutionalization’ has permitted a substantial number of mentally 
disabled persons to receive needed treatment with greater freedom and dignity.”). 
 114. See Ellis, supra note 4, at 1085 (describing “an era when numerous laws 
were passed to sterilize the mentally [disabled] and to isolate them for life in 
institutions”).  Specifically addressing the institutionalization of mentally retarded 
individuals, Justice Marshall wrote: “[T]he mentally retarded have been subject to 
a ‘lengthy and tragic history’ . . . of segregation and discrimination that can only 
be called grotesque.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461 
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978)). 
 115. Integration is “a policy entitling the disabled to full participation in the 
life of the community and encouraging and enabling them to do so . . . .”  Jacobus 
tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. 
REV. 841, 843 (1966).  While Professor tenBroek championed integration 
(“integrationism”) for people with physical disabilities, the concept is applicable to 
people with mental disabilities. 
 116. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1107. 
 117. Id. at 1085 (“The tone of [the Restatement (Second)’s expression] 
betrays, at best, a grudging acceptance of the fact that mentally disabled people 
do, in fact, live in the world.”). 
 118. See Bohlen, supra note 16, at 31–32 (contrasting mentally disabled 
defendants with actual insurers and with those who engage in abnormally 
dangerous activities). 
 119. See, e.g., Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 
18
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disguised, this rationale is yet another iteration of strict liability: 
mentally disabled people should pay regardless of fault. 
The second expression is less openly hostile to people with 
mental disabilities and even purports to help them, and it is less 
obviously a strict liability rationale.  It begs the question, though: 
Why should deinstitutionalization be borne on the backs of those 
who were wrongly120 institutionalized in the first place?  The 
integration movement seeks to correct a wrong from the past.  How 
does holding mentally disabled people living in the community to 
an objective standard of care—that is, imposing strict liability—
accord with the policies behind the Americans with Disabilities Act 
and other mental disability legislation?121  While an injured party 
may be innocent, a mentally disabled injuring party who could not 
meet the standard of a reasonably prudent person through no fault 
of his own is also innocent.122 
Finally, the counterbalancing rationale holds that, since 
people with mental disabilities are often unable to make up for 
their disability, extending a subjective standard would be unjustly 
one-sided.123  Unlike physically disabled people,124 mentally disabled 
people often cannot compensate for their deficiencies.125  For 
mentally disabled people, their mind—and hence their ability to 
avoid risky conduct—is directly affected by their disability.126 
Admittedly, a subjective mental disability standard would be 
more one-sided than the subjective physical disability standard.  
 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-402, § 101(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1677, 1678 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 15001(a)(1) (2006)) (“Congress finds that . . . disability is a natural part of the 
human experience that does not diminish the right of individuals with 
developmental disabilities to live independently . . . and to fully participate in and 
contribute to their communities . . . .”). 
 120. See supra note 114. 
 121. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. III 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 15001(a)(1) 
(2006). 
 122. See SEDGWICK, supra note 65, at 456. 
 123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
11 cmt. e (2010). 
 124. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 125. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1100–01 (“The ability to plan ‘around’ the disability 
will be available less frequently for mentally disabled persons.  The fact that it is 
the individual’s mind that is affected will reduce the occasions when the person 
can identify that his disability is likely to create [risks] for himself or others.”); 
Korrell, supra note 70, at 47 (“When the faculties impaired are the defendant’s 
cognitive ones, his other abilities will not be of much help in avoiding the creation 
of risk.”). 
 126. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of this point vis-à-vis mentally retarded 
adults. 
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Yet, the childhood standard is similarly one-sided—i.e., children 
are not expected to “make up for” their childhood.127  Given the 
absence of other compelling reasons for the objective standard,128 
as well as federal mandates to treat mentally disabled people with 
parity,129 the balance tips in favor of not requiring a 
counterbalancing effect as part of a subjective mental disability 
standard. 
IV. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR 
MENTALLY DISABLED ADULTS 
Neither reason nor policy supports the objective mental 
disability standard, and accordingly courts should adopt a 
subjective standard for adults with mental disabilities.  This is not a 
novel conclusion,130 but it is one worth repeating. 
A. Public Policy and Modern Science Support a Subjective Mental 
Disability Standard 
Public policy favors a subjective mental disability standard.  
Adopting a subjective standard may not impact a large number of 
cases,131 but it would bring the negligence liability of mentally 
disabled adults in line with the full citizenship status that society 
has carved out for them.132  Though not articulated as a “rationale,” 
another likely reason for the objective standard is the public’s 
historical lack of familiarity with, fear of, and hostility toward 
mentally disabled people as compared to physically disabled 
people.133  As stigma against people with mental disabilities 
 
 127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 10(a) (2010). 
 128. See supra notes 77–122 and accompanying text. 
 129. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. III 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 15001 (2006). 
 130. E.g., Bohlen, supra note 16, at 31; Curran, supra note 2, at 65; Ellis, supra 
note 4, at 1108; Korrell, supra note 70, at 56. 
 131. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1109. 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. III 2009); 42 U.S.C. § 15001(a)(1) 
(2006); Ellis, supra note 4, at 1109 (“[O]n balance, [adoption of a subjective 
standard] may be seen as a modest step toward equitable treatment of the 
mentally handicapped . . . .”). 
 133. Curran, supra note 2, at 65; Korrell, supra note 70, at 46 (“Though the era 
of fear and of misunderstanding the nature of mental disability has largely passed, 
it has left us with a legacy of laws designed to restrict the lives of the mentally 
[disabled] . . . .”).  Ellis notes that “mentally disabled people were thought to be a 
major threat to society in the early years of [the twentieth century],” which left a 
“legacy [of] residual fear and discomfort about the mentally disabled.”  Ellis, supra 
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decreases and mental disabilities come to be better understood and 
managed, this rationale loses force.134  Prejudice against a 
historically persecuted class of citizens does not justify the objective 
standard.  As integration increases society’s exposure to people 
with mental disabilities,135 one barrier to a subjective standard is 
decreasing: ignorance.136 
In addition, modern medical and psychological advances have 
broken down the stark distinction between physical and mental 
disease,137 which undermines tort law’s sharp divide between 
physical and mental disabilities, and further bolsters the argument 
for a subjective mental disability standard.138  Modern science has 
shown that there is a physical aspect to—if not a physical origin 
of—many instances of mental disability.139  And as discussed 
above,140 modern psychology allows courts to better identify the 
presence and severity of a host of mental disabilities, which makes a 
subjective mental disability standard more manageable today than 
in the past. 
 
note 4, at 1099.  “This negative side of society’s current ambivalence toward the 
mentally [disabled] may be what the American Law Institute has in mind when it 
refers to the public’s ‘greater familiarity’ with physical [disabilities].”  Id. (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C cmt. b (1965)). 
 134. See Korrell, supra note 70, at 46. 
 135. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1107. 
 136. Still, as society has become more familiar with mental disabilities over the 
past fifty years, the mental disability rule has not changed.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(c) (2010) (stating 
essentially the same rule for mental disability as that stated in section 283B of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965). 
 137. E.g., George L. Engel, The Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for 
Biomedicine, 196 SCIENCE 129, 130–31 (1977) (arguing that the biomedical model 
of disease inappropriately emphasizes the biological (somatic) factors of disease 
and excludes the psychosocial factors of disease).  Dr. Engel examined diabetes as 
a representative of “somatic disease” and schizophrenia as a representative of 
“mental disease” and concluded that both somatic and psychosocial factors are 
critical to each: “[V]irtually each of the symptoms classically associated with 
diabetes may also be expressions of or reactions to psychological distress, just as 
ketoacidosis and hypoglycemia may induce psychiatric manifestations, including 
some considered characteristic of schizophrenia.”  Id. at 131–32. 
 138. Korrell, supra note 70, at 14–19 (“[The objective mental disability 
standard] makes distinctions between mental and physical problems which 
modern medicine does not.”). 
 139. E.g., PARRY, supra note 2, at 56 (noting that current research suggests that 
“at least some [mental illnesses] have a genetic or biochemical component”); 
DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN & MARC CHARMATZ, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER 5–6 
(John Parry & Deborah Zuckerman eds., 4th ed. 1992) (describing several 
biological and organic causes of mental retardation). 
 140. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
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B. A Subjective Mental Disability Standard Is Feasible 
1. Articulating a Subjective Standard 
Not only is a subjective mental disability standard appropriate, 
it is feasible.  To borrow from the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
the expression of a subjective mental disability standard can 
parallel the subjective physical disability standard: The conduct of an 
actor with a mental disability is negligent only if the conduct does not 
conform to that of a reasonably careful person with the same mental 
disability.141  While some may object that such a formulation is 
contradictory,142 such an objection obscures the fact that mentally 
disabled adults have a range of functioning levels and abilities, and 
that many of them have the capacity to avoid some, if not many, 
risks.  Similar to the subjective physical disability standard, the 
mental disabilities taken into account would “generally need to be 
significant and objectively verifiable.”143 
Examining a case that applies the subjective physical disability 
standard helps illustrate how a subjective mental disability standard 
would function.  In Roberts v. State,144 Burson, a blind concession 
stand operator, bumped into and injured the plaintiff while 
walking from his stand to the men’s bathroom in the lobby of a 
U.S. Post Office building.145  Burson had worked at the stand for 
over three years and did not use a cane when making short trips 
inside the building, instead relying on his “facial sense.”146  The 
court found that Burson was familiar with the building and cited 
expert testimony that blind people often rely on techniques other 
than a cane when walking in a familiar setting.147  One expert noted 
that, in a busy environment, a “cane can be more of a hazard than 
an asset.”148  The court concluded: 
 
 141. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 11(a) (2010) (“The conduct of an actor with a physical disability is 
negligent only if the conduct does not conform to that of a reasonably careful 
person with the same disability.”). 
 142. Ellis is sensitive to this concern: “‘[T]he reasonable person with similar 
mental [disability]’ is a formulation that is at least initially confusing for courts 
and juries . . . .”  Ellis, supra note 4, at 1101. 
 143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
11 cmt. a (2010). 
 144. 396 So. 2d 566 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
 145. Id. at 566–67. 
 146. Id. at 567–68. 
 147. Id. at 568. 
 148. Id. 
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Upon our review of the record, we feel that plaintiff has 
failed to show that Burson was negligent.  Burson testified 
that he was very familiar with his surroundings . . . .  He 
had special mobility training and his reports introduced 
into evidence indicate good mobility skills.  He explained 
his decision to rely on his facial sense instead of his cane 
for these short trips in a manner which convinces us that 
it was a reasoned decision.149 
The court assessed Burson’s conduct by examining all the 
circumstances, in light of Burson’s physical disability and with the 
aid of expert testimony.  A subjective mental disability standard 
would involve the same type of analysis. 
Courts could take an adult’s mental disability into account 
either as a subjective standard of care or as an affirmative 
defense.150  While both approaches would bring about greater 
parity for adults with mental disabilities, a subjective standard of 
care is preferable.  A child or physically disabled defendant has the 
benefit of a subjective standard, where the plaintiff has the burden 
of proof to establish that the defendant’s conduct did not meet the 
relevant standard.151  While an affirmative defense for mentally 
disabled defendants is better than the current rule, there is no 
credible reason why mentally disabled defendants should have a 
greater burden of proof than children and physically disabled 
defendants. 
2. Borrowing from Other Contexts 
A subjective mental disability standard is further supported by 
courts’ former experience152 of taking a plaintiff’s mental disability 
 
 149. Id. at 569. 
 150. After his critique of the objective mental disability standard, Korrell 
articulates an affirmative defense for mental disability as a four-part test: 
If the defendant, because of his [mental] disability, (1) could not 
appreciate the consequences of or the risks posed by his conduct, or (2) 
could not comprehend the circumstances under which he acted, or (3) 
lacked the capacity to act differently or to refrain [from acting], and (4) 
thus could not conform his conduct to the standard required, his failure 
to conform to the law will be excused. 
Korrell, supra note 70, at 49. 
 151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 10(a), 11(a) (2010).  
 152. See, e.g., Seattle Elec. Co. v. Hovden, 190 F. 7, 9 (9th Cir. 1911) (‘“In 
determining the existence of [contributory] negligence, we are not to hold the 
plaintiff liable for faults which arise from inherent physical or mental defects or 
want of capacity to appreciate what is and what is not negligence . . . .”’ (quoting 
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into account when determining contributory negligence.153  In the 
past, a majority of jurisdictions held that an adult plaintiff with a 
mental disability had the benefit of a subjective contributory 
negligence standard.154  For decades, mentally disabled adults 
encountered a dual negligence standard: a defendant faced an 
objective standard while a plaintiff faced a subjective standard.155 
The dual standard may stem from the difference in public 
sentiment toward mentally disabled plaintiffs and defendants.156  
While the threat of mentally disabled defendants injuring others 
was long imbedded in the social imagination,157 mentally disabled 
plaintiffs who were unable to adequately defend themselves from 
being injured were likely seen in a more sympathetic light.158  
Another explanation for the dual standard is that at least two 
rationales—incentive and integration—“lose much of their force” 
when applied to mentally disabled plaintiffs.159  Whatever the 
reasons, courts throughout the country successfully administered a 
subjective standard for mentally disabled plaintiffs,160 which 
indicates that courts are capable of administering a subjective 
 
Balt. & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Cumberland, 176 U.S. 232, 238 (1900))); Noel v. 
McCaig, 258 P.2d 234, 241 (Kan. 1953) (“Since knowledge and appreciation of the 
peril are essential elements of contributory negligence, it is obvious that an inquiry 
into the age, experience, and mental capacity of the plaintiff is material where 
contributory negligence is invoked as a defense.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Korrell cites courts’ experience of taking a plaintiff’s mental disability 
into account as support for his mental disability defense.  Korrell, supra note 70, at 
47–49.  
 153. The contributory negligence doctrine is “[t]he principle that completely 
bars a plaintiff’s recovery if the damage suffered is partly the plaintiff’s own fault.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (9th ed. 2009). 
 154. See Bohlen, supra note 16, at 29–30; Ellis, supra note 4, at 1090–91; Korell, 
supra note 70, at 48–55; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. e (2010). 
 155. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1090–92; Terry, supra note 27, at 47. 
 156. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1091–92. 
 157. Id. at 1085 (“By the late nineteenth century[,] . . . mentally disabled 
people were seen as a threat to society, both through their own wicked actions and 
through the likelihood that they would ‘swamp’ society with their ‘incompetence’ 
if allowed to reproduce.” (citing WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE 
OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL MODELS (1975))).  Perception of this threat continued into 
the twentieth century.  Id. 
 158. Id. at 1091.  Courts were also likely sensitive to the harshness of the all-or-
nothing contributory negligence system, where a plaintiff lost all his recovery if he 
was deemed contributorily negligent.  See id. 
 159. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 47, § 32, at 178 (noting that 
both rationales are based on the risk of mentally disabled people injuring others, 
not the risk of mentally disabled people being injured by others). 
 160. See Korrell, supra note 70, at 48. 
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standard for mentally disabled defendants as well. 
With the shift to comparative negligence,161 neither an adult 
plaintiff’s nor an adult defendant’s mental disability is taken into 
account when determining whether she is negligent.162  Instead, a 
party’s mental disability is taken into account only when 
responsibility for an injury is apportioned,163 if at all.164  Under the 
modern comparative negligence and apportionment system, a 
mentally disabled plaintiff’s recovery is reduced if she is deemed 
comparatively negligent,165 regardless of whether she was actually 
capable of protecting herself. 
Jurisdictions do not need to return to a contributory 
negligence regime166 to adopt a subjective standard of care for 
mentally disabled adults.  In addition to courts’ past experience of 
taking mental disability into account through the contributory 
negligence system, they have that experience in several other 
contexts: in civil proceedings such as guardianship, commitment, 
and testamentary capacity;167 where children’s mental disabilities 
are at issue;168 and, more recently, in apportionment of 
 
 161. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 201, at 503−04.  The comparative negligence 
doctrine is the “principle that reduces a plaintiff’s recovery proportionally to the 
plaintiff’s degree of fault in causing the damage, rather than barring recovery 
completely.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 321 (9th ed. 2009). 
 162. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 3 (2000) 
(“Plaintiff’s negligence is defined by the applicable standard for a defendant’s 
negligence.”).  The Restatement explicitly rejects the dual standard: “Special 
ameliorative doctrines for defining plaintiff’s negligence are abolished.”  Id. 
 163. Id. § 8 cmt. c (“The relevant factors for assigning percentages of 
responsibility include . . . each person’s abilities and disabilities . . . .”). 
 164. Id. § 8 cmt. c, illus. 7 (“The court has discretion, where appropriate, to 
limit inquiry into [an actor’s mental disability] on the ground that it would be too 
prejudicial, confusing, or misleading or would cause undue delay.”). 
 165. If the injury occurred in a modified comparative negligence jurisdiction 
and the plaintiff is deemed fifty percent or fifty-one percent negligent, depending 
on the jurisdiction, she is denied recovery altogether.  Id. § 7 cmt. n.  This shows 
how an arguably unjust result may occur based on the difference of only a few 
percentage points of responsibility.  If a person’s mental disability compromises 
her capacity to anticipate, perceive, or avoid risks, a more equitable approach 
would be to take that characteristic into account at the outset.  See supra notes 144–
49 and accompanying text. 
 166. In general, the all-or-nothing nature of contributory negligence should 
probably not be resurrected.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 10 cmt. e (2010) (“[C]omparative negligence 
renders much less severe the impact of many findings of contributory negligence: 
under comparative negligence, such a finding may merely diminish the 
[plaintiff’s] recovery.”); DOBBS, supra note 3, § 199. 
 167. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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responsibility.169  This experience demonstrates that courts can 
adequately manage a subjective standard for mental disability. 
3. Easy and Hard Cases 
Granted, some applications of a subjective mental disability 
standard would be more straightforward than others.  The easiest 
cases involve caretakers who are injured by their mentally disabled 
charges, and these cases are already decided under something like 
a subjective standard.170  When a mentally disabled defendant 
injures a caretaker, as in a nursing home or other institutional 
setting, the defendant may not be held liable for the harm 
caused.171  This is because the caretaker is paid to confront the risk 
of being injured by the charge.172 
The easier cases involve a plaintiff who was put on notice of a 
defendant’s mental disability or a defendant who was put on notice 
of a plaintiff’s mental disability.173  In these situations, the non-
disabled actor’s “reasonable expectations” are not frustrated by the 
mentally disabled actor’s inability to avoid or minimize the risk of 
 
 169. See supra note 161–65 and accompanying text. 
 170. E.g., Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659 (Ind. 2000) (holding that a patient 
with Alzheimer’s disease who kicked and injured his nursing assistant did not owe 
a duty of care to the assistant).  In Creasy, the Supreme Court of Indiana first 
adopted the objective mental disability standard articulated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, id. at 661–67, but then held that the Restatement’s policy 
rationales did not apply given the relationship of the parties. Id. at 667–68.  
 171. Id. at 667. 
 172. Id.  (“Rusk’s inability to comprehend the circumstances of his 
relationship with Creasy . . . was the very reason Creasy was employed to support 
Rusk. . . . Creasy . . . [was] ‘employed to encounter, and knowingly did encounter, 
just the dangers which injured’ Creasy.” (quoting Anicet v. Gant, 580 So. 2d 273, 
276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991))).  The fact that a mentally disabled person is 
entrusted to an institution’s care may serve as a proxy for determining the severity 
of the disability, which otherwise would require the assistance of expert testimony.  
Id. at 668–69.  According to Kelley, “[A] custodial institution charged with the care 
of a mentally [disabled charge] . . . has notice of the” charge’s mental disability.  
Kelley, supra note 20, at 234. 
 173. E.g., Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).  In Lynch, 
plaintiff was a twenty-four year old mentally retarded man who was taken in at the 
age of twelve by defendant farmer’s wife.  Id. at 274.  Plaintiff, who had a mental 
age of about ten, assisted defendant with his farm.  Id. at 274–75.  Plaintiff severely 
injured his right arm in defendant’s corn picker and sued defendant, alleging 
negligence.  Id. at 274.  Defendant claimed that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law.  Id. at 277.  Because defendant knew of plaintiff’s 
mental disability and defendant had not instructed him to stay away from the corn 
picker, the court held that the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence was 
properly submitted to the jury.  Id. at 278.  
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harm.174  For example, someone interacting with a person with 
Down’s syndrome, whose facial characteristics are well known and 
readily identifiable, may be put on notice of that person’s mental 
disability. 
The harder cases involve a non-disabled party that did not 
have notice of the other party’s mental disability.  This may occur 
where an individual’s mental disability is not obvious or where she 
is doing something that may not give notice of her disability.175  
Some argue that a lack of notice is dispositive against application of 
a subjective mental disability standard.176  However, the same 
critique could be leveled at the subjective physical disability and 
childhood standards.  Some physical disabilities (e.g., partial 
hearing or vision loss, or mild cerebral palsy) present a lack of 
notice, and, while younger children often spontaneously give 
notice of their childhood, the same cannot be said of older 
children.  Similar to the physical disability and childhood 
standards, notice should not be a requirement of a subjective 
mental disability standard.  
V. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A SUBJECTIVE 
STANDARD FOR ADULTS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 
Because courts have declined to adopt a subjective standard of 
care for all mentally disabled adults, they should consider treating 
individual types of mental disabilities under a subjective standard.  
The characteristics of mental retardation may make a subjective 
standard particularly appropriate for individuals with this mental 
disability. 
 
 174. Seidelson, supra note 79, at 46. 
 175. E.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961) (holding 
defendant with schizophrenia liable for negligence when she walked out of a 
psychiatric hospital unattended, got into an idling car, and drove into plaintiff’s 
car).  In Johnson, plaintiff had no notice of defendant’s mental disability.  See id.  It 
should be noted that a mentally disabled person who knows that she should not 
participate in certain activities, such as driving, but does so anyway would not 
receive the benefit of a subjective mental disability standard. 
 176. See Kelley, supra note 20, at 223–52; Seidelson, supra note 79, at 46.  In 
addition to challenging a subjective mental disability standard of care, both 
Seidelson and Kelley criticize the physical disability and childhood standards, 
arguing that an actor should be held to an objective standard of care any time the 
other party lacked notice of the actor’s disability, thus frustrating the nondisabled 
party’s “reasonable expectations.”  Kelley, supra note 20, at 223–52; Seidelson, 
supra note 79, at 46. 
27
McKnite: When Reasonable Care Is Unreasonable: Rethinking the Negligence L
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
1402 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:4 
A. Mental Retardation and Other Mental Disabilities Have Been 
Considered Together with Mental Illness Under the Broad Category, 
“Mental Disability” 
Courts have made little, if any, attempt to differentiate 
between various mental disabilities for purposes of tort liability.177  
The Restatement rules make no distinction.178  Historically, the 
same terminology was used regardless of the type of disability.179  As 
negligence law developed, the differences between mental 
retardation and mental illness180 seem to have been overlooked, as 
the two groups were combined under the umbrella term “insanity” 
and, later, “mental disability.”181  Compared to mental illness, there 
are few cases addressing the negligence liability of mentally 
retarded adults.  This is true at least in part because there are far 
fewer mentally retarded people than mentally ill people,182 and 
thus far fewer injuries produced by mentally retarded adults. 
B. Even if All Mentally Disabled Adults Are Not Granted a Subjective 
Standard, Mentally Retarded Adults Should Be 
Mental retardation is a distinct class with readily identifiable 
characteristics,183 and courts should distinguish it from mental 
 
 177. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1081 n.10. 
 178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
11(c) (2010) (addressing “[a]n actor’s mental or emotional disability”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965) (addressing an actor’s “insanity or 
other mental deficiency”). 
 179. W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Contributory Negligence of Mentally Incompetent or 
Mentally or Emotionally Disturbed Person, 91 A.L.R.2D 392, 392 n.1 (1963) (noting 
that the term “insane” referred to “[o]utright insanity as well as the less severe 
forms of mental and emotional aberration”).  See supra note 2 for further 
discussion of this point. 
 180. Because the vast majority of mental disability negligence cases involve 
individuals with mental illness, this section at times discusses mental illness as a 
paradigm mental disability. 
 181. This author has not found any case or article that questions the grouping 
of mental disabilities into one class for purposes of tort liability.  See Curran, supra 
note 2, at 61. 
 182. According to the APA, the prevalence of mental retardation is 
approximately one percent.  DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 46.  In contrast, the 
prevalence of schizophrenia (a mental illness) alone is approximately one percent.  
Id. at 308. 
 183. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.  Mental retardation does share 
some characteristics with other mental disabilities, in particular other 
developmental disabilities.  PARRY, supra note 2, at 56 (stating that mental 
retardation and autism are both developmental disabilities, which are “pervasive, 
lifelong disabilities . . . typically identified at birth or during childhood”).  Yet 
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disability in general by granting adults with mental retardation a 
subjective standard of care.  Such an approach is justified by the 
nature of mental retardation, the relative administrative ease of a 
subjective standard for mentally retarded adults, and a limited 
comparison between children and mentally retarded adults. 
Unlike adults with mental illness, adults with mental 
retardation categorically lack the “attention, knowledge, 
intelligence, and judgment”184 of a reasonably prudent person.  
The distinguishing features of mental retardation are diminished 
intelligence and compromised adaptive functioning.185  While the 
mental functioning of an individual with any significant mental 
disability is compromised to some extent, a signature trait of 
mental retardation is decreased cognitive and intellectual 
functioning—and this trait is primary in a mentally retarded person.  
While a mentally ill person’s intellectual functioning—and hence 
ability to anticipate, perceive, and respond to risks—may be 
diminished by her mental illness, this diminishment is often a 
secondary trait of her primary mental illness. 
A subjective standard for mentally retarded adults would be 
easier to administer than one for mentally disabled adults 
generally.  Some mental disabilities are harder to diagnose and 
classify than others, but their myriad nature cannot be denied.186  
While mental retardation has a range of severities, it is concisely 
defined187 and manageably classified.188  The presence and severity 
of mental retardation may be contested in a given individual, yet 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has defined four 
degrees of the disability.189  The APA’s classification system would 
allow courts to determine what would constitute reasonable 
 
mental retardation remains distinct.  E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (“[T]he mentally retarded as a group are indeed 
different from others not sharing their misfortune . . . .”). 
 184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (1965). 
 185. Mental retardation “is characterized by significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning . . . with onset before age 18 years and concurrent deficits 
or impairments in adaptive functioning.”  DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 39. 
 186. See id. at 49–729 (classifying all mental disabilities besides mental 
retardation in 681 pages). 
 187. See supra note 4. 
 188. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 2, at 41–49 (classifying mental retardation in 
nine pages). 
 189. The four degrees of mental retardation are: mild (IQ level 50–55 to 
approximately 70); moderate (IQ level 35–40 to 50–55); severe (IQ level 20–25 to 
35–40), and profound (IQ level below 20 or 25).  Id. at 42. 
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conduct for an adult with a particular degree of mental 
retardation.190  In addition, mental retardation is often observable, 
even in individuals in the “mild” range, which would further aid 
courts in administering a subjective standard for mentally retarded 
adults.  While some other mental disabilities are also observable, 
many are not. 
In addition to administrative considerations, mental 
retardation is more analogous to the “disability” of childhood than 
are other mental disabilities, which further supports a subjective 
standard of care.191  Adults with mental retardation are commonly 
described as having a childhood “mental age” that approximates 
their level of cognitive functioning.192  While a minor cannot help 
his immaturity, neither can a mentally retarded adult help his 
mental age.193  This comparison has its limits,194 but it could give a 
court or a jury helpful context in assessing a mentally retarded 
adult’s conduct.195 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This note does not advocate that an adult with mental 
retardation or another mental disability who carelessly causes harm 
to another should never be held liable for her conduct.  Rather, it 
argues that her disability should be factored into whether or not 
she is held liable for negligence.  People carelessly injured by 
others often deserve compensation.  But that compensation should 
 
 190. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the subjective childhood standard. 
 192. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1105; e.g., Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272, 274–
75 (Mo. App. 1965) (concerning a twenty-four-year-old man with the mental age 
of a nine-and-a-half- to ten-and-a-half-year-old); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 459 A.2d 421, 
422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (concerning a twenty-six-year-old woman with the 
mental age of a four-and-a-half- to eight-year-old). 
 193. See Bohlen, supra note 16, at 29 (“In the case of infants there is, of course, 
no room for a liability based upon the infant’s responsibility for his immaturity, for 
an infant cannot be held responsible for the date of his birth.”). 
 194. Ellis, supra note 4, at 1105–06 (noting that the functioning level of a 
mentally retarded adult is not based solely on his IQ, but also on his many years of 
experience in the world, and that “mental age” alone does not give a full picture 
of an individual). 
 195. Admittedly, children grow up, so their special treatment by negligence 
law is temporary.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  On the other hand, a 
subjective standard for adults with mental retardation would apply for their entire 
lives.  It is worth noting that the physical disability standard also applies lifelong.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(a) 
(2010). 
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/6
  
2012] WHEN REASONABLE CARE IS UNREASONABLE 1405 
not come at the expense of the fundamental basis of modern tort 
liability: fault. 
A likely critique of granting a subjective standard of care to 
mentally retarded adults is that doing so would open the floodgates 
to granting it to adults with other mental disabilities.  This note 
addresses mental retardation because this mental disability is the 
author’s area of expertise.196  That similar arguments could, 
perhaps, be made for granting a subjective standard to adults with 
other mental disabilities does not undermine the argument for 
granting one to adults with mental retardation.  An argument for 
extending a subjective standard to adults with a different type of 
mental disability would need to stand on its own merits. 
American negligence law has tenaciously adhered to its 
treatment of mentally disabled adults.197  A leading rationale for the 
objective standard is that a subjective standard would be too 
difficult to administer.  Ironically, the force of this argument largely 
comes from the law’s combining of such diverse mental disabilities 
as Alzheimer’s disease and borderline personality disorder, autism 
and schizophrenia.198  Considering individual types of mental 
disabilities, as this note considers mental retardation, could offer 
courts a means of altering their long-standing and rigid approach 
to mental disability. 
 
 
 196. The author took undergraduate coursework in mental retardation and 
other developmental disabilities.  His knowledge of adults with mental retardation 
is largely informed by his professional experience working in group homes and 
other settings since 2000. 
 197. While endorsing the principle of stare decisis, Professor Edgar 
Bodenheimer noted: “In the United States, stare decisis has never been considered 
an inexorable command, and the duty to follow precedent is held to be qualified 
by the right to overrule prior decisions.”  EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: 
THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW 429 (rev. ed. 1974). 
 198. E.g., Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Wis. 1996) 
(noting that “[m]ental impairments and emotional disorders come in infinite 
types and degrees,” and refusing to take mental disability into account “given the 
complexities of the various mental illnesses and the increasing rate at which new 
illnesses are discovered”). 
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